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AI Bubble: Economic Necessity?

Duncan Young
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AI Bubble: Economic Necessity?

Is it an AI Bubble?

If history has a rhythm, this feels like one of its crescendos. Every few decades, a new story captures investors’ imaginations: railroads, radio, semiconductors, the Internet, crypto. Each time, the same question appears, dressed in different language: is this genuine progress, or the system’s latest attempt to outrun its own limits?

This decade’s answer seems obvious: Artificial Intelligence.

While only a technology, it’s the organizing principle of the financial market right now. In a matter of months, OpenAI and its peers have become, by some measures, systemically important to the U.S. economy. And that phrase, “systemically important,” deserves attention.

Systemic importance isn’t about how big a company is. It’s about how deeply it becomes woven into the system’s definition of success. When markets, governments, and investors all begin to treat the prosperity of a handful of firms as synonymous with the prosperity of the economy itself. They become too big to fail, whether anyone says so out loud or not.

This is a familiar dynamic. Banks in 2008. The Internet in 2000. Railroads in 1873. In every case, capital funds innovation while unintentionally redefined stability around it.

The story quickly flows from “this could change everything” to “if this fails, everything changes.”

That’s roughly where we are today. Trillions in market value, a global hardware race, political interest at the national security level, and fiscal policy indirectly aimed at enabling it. AI has moved from “sector” to “substrate.” It’s now part of how society is measuring growth, productivity, and even national competitiveness.

Is that a bad thing? Not necessarily. Technological revolutions often should reshape society. But the risk isn’t in the technology, it’s in the assumptions we build around it. Once success becomes mandatory, risk-taking turns into risk-blindness.

So, before deciding whether we’re in an “AI bubble,” it’s worth asking a deeper question: what does it mean when the global financial system needs this narrative to be true?

How We Got Here

Every bubble begins as a rational response to real progress, the challenge is that markets rarely stop at rational.

The current AI boom didn’t emerge in isolation. It’s the product of a long, comfortable tailwind; a generational dividend that’s been paying out for over forty years. That dividend came from two parallel sources: one domestic, one global.

In the U.S., disinflation, deregulation, and digitization combined to create a four-decade stretch where returns exceeded risk. Each downturn seemed shorter than the last, each recovery faster, each innovation more investable. We built an assumption that productivity and equity appreciation were permanently correlated, that if innovation advanced, portfolios would follow.

But the more powerful driver wasn’t local. It was China. For decades, the global economy quietly relied on a once-in-history surge of cheap productivity. Hundreds of millions of new workers entered the global labor pool, and China’s high savings rate, born from a one-child policy and limited social safety net, created what economists called a “global savings glut.” That flood of capital kept interest rates low, funding Western consumption and investment alike.

In effect, the developed world exported inflation and imported prosperity. Capital got cheaper, leverage got safer, and every investment model built since the early 1990s assumed that this was normal.

Now that demographic wave is reversing. Populations are aging almost everywhere, but the world’s most populous country is aging fastest, and top-heavy demographics mean fewer workers supporting more retirees, fewer savers funding more debt. The same forces that kept capital cheap are evaporating.

That’s the context in which the AI boom arrived. A system accustomed to perpetual tailwinds now faces structural headwinds: slower growth, heavier debt, and higher real rates. Investors, policymakers, and corporations alike are searching for the next engine of productivity that can offset demographic drag and sustain returns.

AI, conveniently, promises exactly that. It’s marketed not just as a technology, but as the solution to the productivity gap. The story writes itself: if human labor is aging out, maybe machine intelligence can pick up the slack.

That’s the setup for what follows - a world where capital needs exponential productivity to justify its own valuations. And when systems start needing miracles to stay stable, it’s worth asking whether the miracle is real or just necessary.

The Productivity Gap

Economists use the term dependency ratio to describe the relationship between those who produce and those who rely on that production, the number of workers relative to retirees, children, or others not in the labor force. In a healthy economy, each worker supports a manageable share of dependents. When that ratio deteriorates, growth slows, savings shrink, and productivity has to do more of the work.

That is where we find ourselves now. The world’s demographic dividend has matured into a demographic liability. Fewer workers are expected to support more retirees, higher healthcare costs, and mounting government debt. To sustain the standard of living that the past four decades normalized: each unit of capital and each worker must become more productive, exponentially so.

Enter AI, presented as the great equalizer. The narrative is intuitive: if the labor force is shrinking, automation and machine intelligence can fill the gap. But here lies the tension. The infrastructure required to build and operate AI - energy, chips, data centers, and specialized labor - is capital intensive. It demands vast up-front investment and constant reinvestment. This is the opposite of the frictionless productivity that many assume it delivers.

So while policymakers and investors treat AI as the answer to the dependency problem, the reality may be that it merely shifts the dependency, from people to capital, from labor to energy, from demographics to hardware cycles. Instead of an economy supported by workers, we may be building one supported by a handful of corporate balance sheets and national subsidies.

That isn’t inherently bad, but it does create fragility. The higher the capital concentration, the more each downturn threatens the foundation. AI may one day enhance productivity, but for now, it amplifies our economic dependencies rather than eliminating them.

In that sense, the “AI revolution” is not freeing us from the old cycle of growth and leverage. It is deepening it, replacing demographic pressure with technological pressure. And as we will see next, this shift doesn’t just reshape economies; it reshapes how investors think about safety itself.

When Safe Assets Stopped Being Safe

Every financial system is built on the idea of safety. For most of the past century, that meant cash, Treasuries, and broad equity diversification. Those assumptions worked because the system they supported was stable, not because they were inherently safe.

That framework is starting to fail. Currency and sovereign debt, once considered the bedrock of low-risk investment, now carry structural risk of their own. High government leverage, geopolitical uncertainty, and fiscal deficits have turned fixed income into an implicit bet on continued confidence. Bonds still pay interest, but the real question is whether they still store value.

Investors, lacking alternatives, turn to equities as stores of value. What began as ownership in productive companies slowly became a proxy for preservation. The line between “growth” and “safety” blurred. Diversification across sectors or indices provided less protection than it appeared to, because all roads led back to the same drivers: liquidity, rate expectations, and U.S. technology.

Despite “diversified index funds” providing “broad exposure,” this has really become false diversification. Portfolios may look diversified on paper, but they are exposed to a single underlying assumption: that capital markets will remain open, liquid, and optimistic. When everyone is effectively long optimism, there are few places left to hide.

The result is a market that punishes prudence. Selling means missing the next leg up, and holding means absorbing valuation risk. “Never sell” stopped being a slogan and became a survival strategy. With cash punished by inflation and bonds constrained by deficits, the default behavior became passive ownership. The system has shifted from one that managed risk to one that needs to price it in advance.

That leaves asset inflation as the only remaining outlet. When safety and return can no longer be separated, everything drifts toward the same trade - own something, anything, that might hold its value better than money.

Which brings us back to AI. In an era where traditional stores of value have eroded, investors have latched onto innovation itself as the new safe asset. That’s the subtle irony of our time: we now treat the most uncertain frontier of technology as the most certain bet in finance.

Sector Gravity: Trapped in the Trade

Capital doesn’t just chase returns anymore; it chases benchmarks.

For decades, the shift toward passive investing has concentrated the flow of global capital into a handful of large, liquid names. Indexes have become the primary allocator. The bigger a company grows, the more automatic buying it receives. It is no longer about fundamental conviction; it is about mechanical inclusion.

That feedback loop has turned leadership into inevitability. Once a sector begins to outperform, it pulls everything else behind it. Every asset manager benchmarked to the S&P 500, every pension fund trying to keep up with peers, every retail investor buying an ETF, they all end up reinforcing the same trade. Higher prices increase weights, which attract more flows, which justify higher prices.

AI now sits at the center of that loop. The enthusiasm around artificial intelligence is less a bubble of belief than a consequence of how capital is wired. With OpenAI as the narrative core, even though it remains private and largely opaque, the system found its focal point. It does not matter that investors cannot buy OpenAI directly; they can buy everything around it. Microsoft, NVIDIA, Amazon, Alphabet, each serves as a liquid proxy for exposure to the idea.

The irony is that the market’s structure leaves little room for choice. If you manage public money, you have to own the leaders or risk underperforming. Even skeptics end up holding the trade because not holding it looks worse than being wrong later. This is how structural FOMO replaces price discovery. The system cannot leave the trade because there is no credible alternative. Bonds are politically fragile, cash loses value, and every other growth story has already been arbitraged. AI is not just the most compelling narrative; it is the only one big enough to absorb the flow.

So OpenAI is not the cause of this dynamic, it is merely a beneficiary. Its rise is a symptom of capital concentration, not its source. The public markets do not validate OpenAI’s fundamentals; they validate the system’s need for a new center of gravity.

We have seen this pattern before. In every era, one sector becomes the vessel for collective optimism, railroads, steel, dot-coms, crypto. What makes this moment distinct is that the structure of modern finance requires a winner. Indexes cannot sit in cash. Pension funds cannot rotate fast enough. The market can only shift its hope from one story to another.

Right now, that story is AI. Not because it must succeed, but because the system cannot afford for it not to.

The Necessity Trade

Every cycle finds a narrative that feels inevitable. In this one, AI is not simply opportunity; it is obligation.

The world has run out of easy sources of growth. Populations are aging, labor participation is flattening, and the long tailwind from globalization is now a headwind. China’s savings glut has become a drag, Western debt loads are rising, and capital is struggling to earn more than it costs. The system that once multiplied prosperity through demographics and cheap leverage now depends on productivity that no longer comes naturally.

In that environment, AI is not just innovation, it is the placeholder for economic survival. Governments treat it as industrial policy. Corporations treat it as the hedge against wage pressure and aging workforces. Investors treat it as the only plausible path to real growth. Its adoption is not optional; it is embedded in the assumptions behind budgets, valuations, and national strategy.

That explains today’s market posture. AI is priced as a necessity, not a possibility. Cash flows remain distant, but the system values the promise of efficiency because it has no alternative. The premise is simple: if human output cannot expand, machine output must. This is less speculation than triage, a market structure allocating capital toward whatever might preserve productivity.

This dynamic does not depend on confidence so much as constraint. Policy, capital, and technology are now aligned toward the same requirement: making fewer workers and more debt sustainable. AI has become the mechanism through which the system attempts to postpone arithmetic, to keep growth and asset prices moving even as the underlying inputs stagnate.

It is easy to mistake this for euphoria, but the tone is closer to necessity. Markets are not acting like they believe AI will save everything. They are acting like they need it to save enough.

That is why AI’s valuation sits where it does, suspended not between greed and fear, but between survival and adjustment. The system has already written it into the model.

If this framework helped clarify the AI narrative, share it with someone who’s been asking whether we’re in a bubble.

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What Now?

Cycles built on necessity rarely end cleanly.

This one isn’t driven by speculation so much as survival. The global economy is adapting to a world where demographics no longer generate growth, capital is no longer cheap, and governments can no longer purchase productivity through deficits. What remains is a single hope: that technology can do what policy and population no longer can.

Whether this transition ends gently depends on whether AI delivers the productivity already embedded in valuations. If it succeeds, markets could eventually align with real efficiency gains, and the system might settle into a slower but sustainable equilibrium. If it fails, the arithmetic reasserts itself. Consumption must fall or real asset prices will. When productivity stalls while obligations persist, either living standards decline or financial wealth compresses in real terms until balance returns.

The proof won’t come from stock prices or GDP forecasts. It will show up first in cost structures, in the parts of the economy most ready for automation. If AI is truly amplifying productivity, it should begin to lower the cost of judgement-needing structured labor: software development, customer support, clerical work. So far, it hasn’t. Developer wages, contractor rates, and back-office expenses remain firm. That suggests AI may only be shifting costs from labor to capital - into chips, data centers, and energy - rather than removing them.

The next signal will come from the service economies that supply that labor globally. If automation is truly replacing people, unemployment should rise first in markets built on outsourced digital work such as India, the Philippines, parts of Eastern Europe, before reaching developed economies. If employment holds steady, AI is augmenting, not substituting.

Either way, the outcome reshapes power. If automation displaces labor, capital will gain for a while, but the system will hollow underneath it. If AI augments rather than replaces, workers may regain bargaining leverage as scarcity becomes structural. Wages could rise in real terms, but inside a smaller, less consumptive economy. The balance will return, just at a lower level of abundance.

For investors, there’s no clear hedge. Modern finance is built on participation. To opt out is to fall behind; to stay in is to accept concentration risk. The “AI trade” has become the scaffolding of the market itself.

The discipline now is to tell the difference between what’s inevitable and what’s indispensable. AI will likely be foundational, but that doesn’t mean every company or valuation tied to it will endure. Progress and profit rarely move together.

History suggests that when systems overprice abundance, scarcity restores equilibrium. Those who endure are not the most optimistic but the most adaptable - the ones who recognize when innovation becomes dependency and when necessity turns into risk.

So, is this an AI bubble? Not in the speculative sense. However it is a necessity bubble: a market built not on greed, but on collective alignment that something must work.

And if this solution fails, the reckoning will not come from panic, but from real economic constraints.

Epilogue: After the Plague

When the Black Death ended in the fourteenth century, Europe was smaller, poorer, and permanently changed. Labor scarcity shattered the feudal order. Wages rose, wealth shifted, and productivity improved, but only after contraction. The plague did not just take lives; it ended a system that had mistaken population growth for prosperity.

Our present reckoning is quieter and signing up for Social Security, yet the logic rhymes. A system built on youth, leverage, and expansion is aging out. Demographics are reversing, savings are thinning, and capital is discovering that financial abundance no longer guarantees real abundance. The labor shortage we face is gradual and structural. The old model, in which cheaper workers and cheaper money reinforced each other, is ending.

AI is our attempt to substitute for the lost abundance, to produce productivity faster than demographics and debt erode it. If it succeeds, the adjustment could be orderly, with slower growth and adequate stability. If it fails, the correction will be drawn out - existing in the real world as much as the financial one.

The thoughtful stance is not apocalyptic and not complacent. Assume less surplus and fewer free lunches. Prefer cash flows that come from real productivity over those that rely on financial engineering. Use less leverage, accept lower base returns, and prize adaptability. Build portfolios and businesses that function with the AI miracle and without it. If the technology delivers, the upside will accrue to those who remained solvent and patient. If it does not, solvency and patience will be the return.

Every era forgets its limits; every correction reminds it. What follows will show whether AI marks a new beginning, or the point where decades of financial growth finally met their demographic reality.

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